The United States and Pakistan: Navigating a Complex Relationship: Husain Haqqani Prepared Testimony

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I would like to begin by thanking the members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom for the privilege of testifying before you on the situation in Pakistan and U.S. relations with this extremely important country.Pakistan and the United States have been allies since the 1950s but their relations have been far from tension free. When it emerged as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan was considered a moderate Muslim nation that could serve as a model for other emerging independent Muslim states. Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a Shia Muslim. Its first law minister was a Hindu. Its foreign minister belonged to the Ahmadiyya religious community. Although Pakistan's birth was accompanied by religious riots and communal violence, the country's founders clearly intended to create a non-sectarian state that would protect religious freedoms and provide the Muslims of South Asia an opportunity to live in a country where the constituted a majority.Over the years, however, Pakistan has become a bastion of Islamist extremism. The Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims through an amendment to Pakistan's constitution during the 1970s. Shia-Sunni sectarian violence has plagued the country since the 1980s. Religious minorities, such as Hindus and Christians, complain of discrimination and have periodically been subjected to violent attacks by extremists. Although the Pakistani State claims it does not back fanatical extremists, it is important to note that Islamist extremism in Pakistan has risen under several decades of direct or indirect military rule. The disproportionate influence wielded by fundamentalist groups in Pakistan is the result of state sponsorship of such groups. Pakistan's rulers have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan's identity since soon after the country's inception. Under ostensibly pro-western rulers, Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats. Such rulers have attempted to ‘manage' militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves its nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with western countries. General Ziaul Haq went farther than others in ‘Islamizing' Pakistan's legal and educational system but his policy of Islamization was the extension of a consistent State ideology, not an aberration.Until 9/11, Pakistan was the principal backer of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Its decision to abandon the Taliban and support the U.S.-led global war against terrorism has made Pakistan an ally of the United States once again. American policy makers have repeatedly asserted their belief that Pakistan is genuinely trying to transform itself into an "enlightened moderate" state under General Pervez Musharraf's leadership. The selective cooperation of the Musharraf regime in sharing intelligence with the United States and apprehending Al Qaeda members has led to the assumption that Pakistan might be ready to give up its long-standing ties with radical Islam. For its part, the Musharraf regime paints itself as being at war with locally powerful fundamentalists, securing American support in that effort, without radically reorienting Pakistan's core policies going back in history.Islamist groups have been sponsored and supported by the State machinery in Pakistan at different times to influence domestic politics and support the military's political dominance - a point I have highlighted in my forthcoming book ‘Pakistan between Mosque and Military' (Carnegie Endowment, 2005). In the South Asian region, the Islamists have been allies in the Pakistan military's efforts to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure on India for negotiations over the future of Kashmir. As is sometimes the case, relations between ideologically motivated clients and their State patrons are not always smooth, which partly explains the inability of Pakistan's generals to completely control the Islamists in the post 9/11 phase. The alliance between the mosque and the military in Pakistan was forged over time, and its character has changed with the twists and turns of Pakistani history.Pakistan's state institutions, notably national security institutions such as the military and the intelligence services, have played a leading role in attempting to build the Pakistani national identity on the basis of religion since Pakistan's emergence as an independent country in August 1947. This political commitment to an ‘ideological state' gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to the Jihadi ideology, especially during and after the Bangladesh war of 1971. Then, the Pakistani military used Islamist idiom and the help of Islamist groups to keep elected secular leaders supported by the majority Bengali-speaking population out of power. Bengali rebellion and brutal suppression of the Bengalis by the military followed. In the 1971 war the country was bifurcated with the birth of an independent Bangladesh. In the original country's western wing, the effort to create national cohesion between Pakistan's disparate ethnic and linguistic groups through religion took on greater significance and its manifestations became more militant. Religious groups, both armed and unarmed, have become gradually more powerful as a result of this alliance between the mosque and the military. Radical and violent manifestations of Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan's stability, are in some ways a State project gone wrong.In an effort to become an ideological state guided by a praetorian military, Pakistan has ended up accentuating its dysfunction, especially during the last two decades. The commitment or otherwise of the ordinary Pakistani citizen to Islam has hardly been the major issue in Pakistan's evolution. A large number of otherwise practicing Muslims has demonstrated in elections time and again their desire to embrace pragmatic political and economic ideas. Most Pakistanis would probably be quite content with a state that caters to their social needs, respects and protects their right to observe religion and does not invoke Islam as its sole source of legitimacy. But the military's desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan's national security priorities has been the most significant though by no means the only factor in encouraging an ideological paradigm for Pakistan.Pakistan started out with many disadvantages as the seceding state born out of the partition of British India. Some of its security concerns, such as the need for a credible deterrent against India, are real. But the Pakistani military's desire for institutional supremacy within the country has created psychological and political layers to the Pakistani nation's sense of insecurity. The alliance between mosque and military in Pakistan maintain, and sometimes exaggerate these psycho-political fears and help both, the Islamists and the generals, in their exercise of

political power. Support for the Pakistani military by the United States makes it difficult for Pakistan's weak secular civil society to assert itself and wean Pakistan away from the rhetoric of Islamist ideology towards issues of real concern for Pakistan's citizens.From America's point of view, Pakistan offers few political choices. Though listed among the U.S. allies in the war on terrorism, Pakistan cannot be easily characterized as either friend or foe. Indeed, Pakistan has become a major center of radical Islamist ideas and groups, largely because of its past policies toward India and Afghanistan. Pakistan supported Islamist militants fighting Indian rule in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and backed the Taliban in its pursuit of a client regime in Afghanistan. Both were strategic decisions, not religious ones, and the view that the personal religiosity of General Ziaul Haq (who ruled Pakistan between 1977-1988) and Pakistan's participation in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan unleashed the genie of extremism is factually incorrect.In the foreseeable future, Islam will remain a significant factor in Pakistan's politics. Musharraf and his likely successors from the ranks of the military will continue to seek U.S. economic and military assistance with promises of reform; yet the power of such promises is tempered by the strong links between Pakistan's military-intelligence apparatus and extremist Islamists.Pakistan's future direction is crucial to the U.S.-led war against terror, not least because of Pakistan's declared nuclear weapons capability. The historic alliance between Islamists and Pakistan's military has the potential to frustrate antiterrorist operations, radicalize key segments of the Islamic world, and bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war yet again. Unless Pakistan's all-powerful military can be persuaded to gradually turn power over to secular civilians and allow the secular politics of competing economic and regional interests to prevail over religious sentiment, the country's vulnerability to radical Islamic politics will not wane. With the backing of the U.S. government, the Pakistani military would probably be able to maintain a façade of stability over the next several years. But the military, bolstered by American support, would want to maintain pre-eminence and is likely to make concessions to Islamists to legitimize its control of the country's polity. The United States is supporting Pakistan's military so that Pakistan backs away from Islamist radicalism, albeit gradually. But in the process the military's political ambitions are being encouraged, compromising change and preserving the influence of radical Islamists. Democratic reform that allows secular politicians to freely compete for power would is more likely to reduce the influence of radical Islamists.The disproportionate focus of the Pakistani state since Pakistan's independence in 1947 on ideology, military capability, and external alliances has weakened Pakistan internally. The country's institutions-ranging from schools and universities to the judiciary-are in a state of general decline. The economy's stuttering growth is dependent largely on the level of concessional flows of external resources. Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP) stands at about $75 billion in absolute terms and $295 billion in purchasing power parity (PPP), making Pakistan's economy the smallest of any country that has tested nuclear weapons thus far. Pakistan suffers from massive urban unemployment, rural underemployment, illiteracy, and low per capita income: one-third of the population lives below the poverty line and another 21 percent subsists just above it.Soon after independence, 16.4 percent of Pakistan's population was literate, compared with 18.3 percent of India's significantly larger population. By 2003, while India had managed to attain a literacy rate of 65.3 percent, Pakistan's stood at only about 35 percent. Today, Pakistan allocates less than 2 percent of its GDP for education and ranks close to the bottom among 87 developing countries in the amount allotted to primary schools. Its low literacy rate and inadequate investment in education has led to a decline in Pakistan's technological base, which in turn hampers the country's economic modernization. With a population growing at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, the state of public health care and other social services in Pakistan is also in decline. Meanwhile, Pakistan spends almost 5 percent of its GDP on defense and is still unable to match the conventional forces of India, which outspends Pakistan 3 to 1 while allocating less than 2.5 percent of its GDP to military spending. The dominance of the military in Pakistan's internal affairs is a direct outcome of the circumstances during the early years of its statehood. But the circumstances have changed considerably over the years and a planned withdrawal of the military from political life is essential for Pakistan's functioning as a normal state. The partition of British India's assets in 1947 left Pakistan with one-third of the British Indian army and only 17 percent of its revenues. Thus, the military started out as the dominant institution in the new state, and this dominance has continued over the years.Since General Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958, ruling through marital law, the military has directly or indirectly dominated Pakistani politics, set Pakistan's ideological and national security agenda, and repeatedly intervened to direct the course of domestic politics. On four occasions, despite the constant rewriting of its constitution ostensibly to pave the way for sustained democracy, generals seized power directly, claiming that civilian politicians were incapable of running the country.Even during periods of civilian government, the generals have exercised political influence through the intelligence apparatus notably the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) organization. The ISI plays a behind-the-scenes role in exaggerating political divisions to justify military intervention. Partly due to the role of the military and partly because of their own weakness, Pakistan's political factions have often found it difficult to cooperate with one another or to submit to the rule of law. As a result, Pakistan is far from developing a consistent system form of government, with persisting political polarization along three major, intersecting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different ethnic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists.The first crack in contemporary Pakistan's body politic continues to be this perennial dispute over who should wield political power. Musharraf has described Pakistan as "a very difficult country to govern" in view of its myriad internal and external difficulties. Musharraf's view reflects the thinking of the Pakistani military and is possibly self-serving. The military does not allow politics to take its course, periodically accusing elected leaders of compromising national security or of corruption. Repeated military intervention has deprived Pakistan of political leaders experienced in governance, leading to serious lapses under civilian rule. As the military periodically coopts or fires civilian politicians, established and accepted rules for political conduct have failed to evolve. Issues such as the role of religion in matters of state, the division of powers between various branches of government and the authority of the provinces are not settled by constitutional means or through a vote. The military does not let civilians rule but its own rule lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the general public, creating an air of permanent friction. Thus, instead of governing, Pakistan's rulers, including Musharraf, have been reduced to managing

ethnic, religious and provincial tensions.The second major source of conflict in Pakistan is based on these ethnic and provincial differences. Although the majority of Pakistan's ethnically disparate population has traditionally identified with secular politicians, that majority has not always determined the direction of Pakistan's policies, even when expressed in a free and fair election. Highly centralized and unrepresentative governance has created grievances among different ethnic groups, and the state has yet to create any institutional mechanisms for dealing with such discontent. The constitutional provisions relating to provincial autonomy, which could placate each province by allowing self-government, have often been bypassed in practice. Intraprovincial differences-such as those between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns in Balochistan, between the Punjabis and Saraiki in Punjab, between the Pashtuns and Hindko-speakers in Northwest Frontier Province and between the Sindhis and Mohajirs in Sindh-have also festered without political resolution.The third relates to the ideological division over the role of Islam in national life. Having started out as a pressure group outside Parliament, Pakistan's religious parties have now become a well-armed and well-financed force that wields considerable influence within different branches of government. Religious groups have benefited from the patronage of the military and civil bureaucracy, which has seen them as useful tools in perpetuating the military's control over foreign and domestic policy. Because the Islamist worldview is incompatible with the vision of a modern Pakistan, the violent vigilantism of some Islamists has become a serious threat to Pakistani civil society and has also promoted sectarian terrorism. Operating outside the framework of the rule of law, the Islamists have the potential to disrupt the conduct of foreign policy, especially in view of their support for anti-India militants in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan.Radical Islamic groups, which portray themselves as the guardians of Pakistan's ideology, have had a special status conferred to them by the military and civil bureaucracy that normally governs Pakistan. The Islamists claim that they are the protectors of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability, as well as the champion of the national cause of securing Kashmir for Pakistan. Secular politicians who seek greater autonomy for Pakistan's different regions-or demand that religion be kept out of the business of the state-have come under attack from the Islamists for deviating from Pakistan's ideology.Establishing Islam as the state ideology was a device aimed at defining a Pakistani identity during the country's formative years. Indeed, Pakistan's leaders started playing upon religious sentiment as a means of strengthening the country's national identity shortly after Pakistan's inception. Emerging from the partition of British India in 1947 as the result of a relatively short independence movement, Pakistan faced several challenges to its survival, beginning with India's perceived reluctance to accept Pakistan's creation. Pakistan's secular elite used Islam as a national rallying cry against perceived and real threats from predominantly Hindu India. The competition with and fear of India that dominates the Pakistani establishment's thinking over the last 58 years has proven to be equally debilitating to Pakistan's advancement. It is true that the Indians accepted partition only reluctantly and, for some years, spoke of their desire to undo partition. It was natural for Pakistan's leaders immediately after independence to feel insecure about India's intentions. The manner in which Pakistan dealt with that insecurity, however, made India an obsession of Pakistan's leaders rather than a rationally handled security problem. Pakistan stumbled into wars with India not because India threatened to forcibly occupy Pakistan. On each occasion when Pakistan flexed its military muscle and invited war Pakistan's psycho-political, as opposed to physical, insecurity was at play. That Pakistan's establishment continues to speak of Pakistan being under threat even after acquiring, and demonstrating, nuclear weapons capability only affirms the psychological nature of Pakistan's avowed security concerns. Starting out with the desire to secure Kashmir, Pakistan's mishandling of its internal affairs and its confrontation with India led to the country's break up in 1971. In recent years, Pakistani leaders have argued that they need to be militarily powerful to prevent India from becoming the regional hegemon. India's much larger size and economic and military prowess means that Pakistan is likely to get exhausted while running hard to keep pace with India.There is no doubt that Pakistanis have strong feelings over Jammu and Kashmir, which might have been included in Pakistan in accordance with the logic of partition. But much of this strong sentiment has been produced by the constant rhetoric of Kashmir's centrality to Pakistan's existence that has been fed to Pakistanis on a regular basis. 58 years after partition, and in the absence of any incentive or compulsion on the part of India to revise the status quo, it might be prudent for Pakistanis to give priority to normalization and stability in South Asia over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. To make that possible, the Pakistani State must end the rhetoric it has fed to Pakistanis about Kashmir. It appears, so far, that Pakistan's military leadership remains unwilling to change the country's ideological orientation. The Islamists remain important allies of the military in maintaining the country's status as an ideological state as well as to emphasize India's status as an existential threat to Pakistan.Pakistan's military-technocrat leaders generally assumed that the country's clerics and Islamists were too weak and too dependent on the state to confront the power structure. Unsure of their fledgling nation's future, the politicians, civil servants, and military officers who led Pakistan in its formative years decided to exacerbate the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims that had led to partition. It was meant now to define a distinctive identity for Pakistan with "Islamic Pakistan" resisting "Hindu India." Notwithstanding periodic peace processes, hostility between India and Pakistan continues, and in Pakistan it serves as an important element of national identification.Many of Pakistan's contemporary problems can be traced to the concept of the country as an "ideological state" as opposed to the idea of a state based on the consent of its citizens and run according to a constitution. During the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, the Pakistani military used Islamist rhetoric and the help of Islamist groups to keep elected secular leaders supported by the majority Bengali-speaking population out of power in East Pakistan prior to its secession. The Bengalis' rebellion, with India's assistance, and their brutal suppression by the Pakistani military followed an election that would have given power to Bengali politicians in a united Pakistan. The birth of an independent Bangladesh exacerbated Pakistan's insecurity.Whereas India and Bangladesh have both evolved as secular democracies that are focused on economic development, Pakistan continues to be ruled by a civil-military oligarchy that sees itself as defining and also protecting the state's identity-mainly through a mix of religious and militarist nationalism. Hence, in western Pakistan, the effort to create national cohesion between Pakistan's disparate ethnic and linguistic groups through religion took on greater significance and its manifestations became more militant. Religious

groups, both armed and unarmed, gradually became more powerful as a result of this alliance between the mosque and the military. Radical and violent manifestations of Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan's stability even today, can be seen in some ways as a state project gone awry.Pakistan's rulers have traditionally attempted to "manage" militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves the state's nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries. Pakistan's emphasis on its Islamic identity increased significantly as the civilian semiauthoritarian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) channeled Pakistan's Islamic aspirations toward foreign policy. Pakistan played a key role in developing the Organization of Islamic Conference and opened up to special relations with Islamic groups and countries.General Ziaul Haq's military regime (1977-1988) took matters a step further domestically, basing Pakistan's legal and educational system on Islamic law; formalizing the preexisting state ideology into an official policy of Islamization . Through his Islamization efforts, Ziaul Haq made Pakistan an important ideological and organizational center of the global Islamist movement, including its leading role in the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s by allowing Afghanistan's Mujahideen to operate from bases in Pakistan, inflicting a heavy toll on the Red Army.The success of the Jihadist experiment against the Soviets encouraged Pakistan's strategic planners to expand the jihad against India and into post-Soviet Central Asia. Pakistan's sponsorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan, together with the presence in its territory of Islamist militants from all over the world derived from Islamabad's desire to emerge as the center of a global Islamic resurgence. Ironically, religious fervor did not motivate all Pakistani leaders who supported this strategy; in most cases, they simply embraced Islam as a politico-military strategic doctrine that would enhance Pakistan's prestige and position in the world. The focus on building an "ideological state," however, has subsequently caused Pakistan to lag behind in almost all areas that define a functional modern state.In the last few years, however, the situation has deteriorated even further. The Islamists are not content with having a secondary role in national affairs and have acquired a momentum of their own. Years of religious rhetoric have influenced a younger generation of military officers. The ISI, in particular, includes a large number of officials who have assimilated the Islamist beliefs they were rhetorically called on to support in the course of jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Because Musharraf and the Pakistani military still see secular politicians, rather than the Islamists, as their rivals for political power, they have continued to use Islamists for political purposes.In 2003, Musharraf's administration sought the backing of the Islamists for a set of constitutional amendments increasing the president's power and in return recognized an Islamist as the leader of the parliamentary opposition. Major figures of the secular opposition have been exiled or jailed on corruption or sedition charges, positioning the Islamists as Pakistan's major opposition group. This has enabled the Islamists to exercise greater influence than would have been possible in an open democratic political system, given the poor electoral performance of Islamic groups in Pakistan's intermittent elections since gaining independence.Pakistan's civil-military elite's focus on a national ideology has been motivated by its fear that some Pakistani ethnic groups have an insufficient commitment to the idea of Pakistan. This may have been partly true in the Pakistan's formative years. Now, however, most of the previously rebellious tribes and ethnicities would be content with their fair share in political and economic power. Regional autonomy and an inclusive democratic political system would be a more effective means of holding Pakistan together than a state ideology. In the absence of an imposed ideology there would be less likelihood of debates over defining that ideology and sectarian conflict would be averted. Most significantly, if a state ideology is no longer central to national discourse, the influence for political as well as militant Islamists would be greatly reduced.Pakistan's Islamists made their strongest showing in a general election during parliamentary voting in October 2002, securing 11.1 percent of the popular vote and 20 percent of the seats in the lower house of Parliament. The Musharraf regime's decision to bar two former Prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, and several of their followers from the election helped the Islamists achieve these electoral results. The two leading secular parties, Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had to contend with corruption proceedings relating to their tenures in office as well as the Musharraf government's intense propaganda supporting these allegations. The candidates of the alliance of Islamic parties-the United Action Council (Mutahhida Majlis Amal, MMA)-did not face disqualification, and Islamic party leaders campaigned freely. Anti-U.S. sentiment in the areas bordering Afghanistan particularly benefited the MMA, which made electoral gains without dramatically increasing the share of votes traditionally won by Islamic parties. Secular parties suffered due to redistricting as well as the disqualification of some non-Islamist candidates. While the leaders of the PML and PPP were forced into exile, MMA leaders could campaign freely. This ensured full turnout of Islamist voters at the polls while some supporters for the major parties did not show up to vote.The Musharraf government started recognizing the MMA as the main opposition in Parliament, even though Bhutto's PPP had the single largest bloc of opposition parliamentarians, 81 to the MMA's 63. Musharraf was deliberately projecting the MMA as his primary opposition to create the illusion that radical Islamist groups are gaining power through democratic means. The purpose is to minimize the prospect that the international community, especially the United States, would press for democratic reform in Pakistan (particularly while Musharraf offers support in the war against Al Qaeda). Musharraf made repeated pronouncements to reassure the world of his intention to alter Pakistan's policy direction radically since September 11 moving it away from its Islamist and Jihadist past. Musharraf's administration continues to project the war against terrorism as a U.S. war that is being waged with Pakistani help-even after attempts on his life and that of his handpicked prime minister, Shaukat Aziz in 2003 and 2004. Islamabad continues to make a distinction between foreign fighters-such as those from Al Qaeda, whom Pakistani forces have been pursuing-and homegrown terrorists who were originally trained to fight Indian troops in Kashmir. Musharraf has altered Ziaul Haq's course of Islamization but only marginally. The government now encourages women's participation in public life and cultural events involving song and dance are openly allowed, even encouraged. State owned media has become more culturally liberal and private radio and television stations with unrestricted entertainment content have been allowed. But controversial Islamic laws, such as those relating to blasphemy and Hudood (Islamic limits) have not been withdrawn.Musharraf and the Pakistani military remain willing to compromise with the Islamists far

more than with secular politicians. For example, the MMA has been greater freedom to organize rallies and manifest its street power than either the PPP or the opposition faction of the PML.Still, notwithstanding Musharraf's proclamations of a vision of "enlightened moderation" for Pakistan, contradictions in his domestic, regional, and international policies are apparent. The greatest commitment he has demonstrated so far is his view that he is indispensable for Pakistan and that Pakistan is safer under the stewardship of the military rather than under civilian democratic rule. This duality in speaking of enlightened moderation while keeping alive the perception that he is faced with Islamist opposition justifies military intervention and governance and reflects the structural problem in Pakistan's politics-a situation created by the weakness of civilian institutions and the armed forces' dominance of decision-making.On several occasions, Pakistan has been seen as a state on the brink of failure, temporarily restored with U.S. military and economic assistance only to return to the brink again. Pakistan, suffering from chronically weak state institutions, continues to face a deep identity crisis and a rising threat from independent, radical Islamists. The government's fears about its viability and security have led Islamabad to seek an alliance with the United States, while simultaneously pursuing a nuclear deterrent and subconventional military capability (that is, Islamist terrorism) against India. The US response to 9/11 left Pakistan with little choice but to turn more drastically toward the US. Confronted with an ultimatum to choose between being with the US or against it, Pakistan's generals opted to revive their alliance with the US. But at every stage since then, Pakistan has proven to be a US ally of convenience, not of conviction, seeking specific rewards for specific actions.Pakistan's military has historically been willing to adjust its priorities to fit within the parameters of immediate U.S. global concerns. The purpose has been to ensure the flow of military and economic aid from the United States, which Pakistan considers necessary for its struggle for survival and its competition with India. Pakistan's relations with the U.S. have been part of the Pakistani military's policy tripod that emphasizes Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state's foreign policy, and an alliance with the United States as a means to defray the costs of Pakistan's massive military expenditures. But these policy precepts have served to encourage extremist Islamism, which in the last few years has been the source of threats to both U.S. interests and global security. The U.S. can perhaps deal best with Pakistan in the long-term by using its influence to reshape the Pakistani military's view of the national interest.The United States recognized the troubling potential of Islamist politics in the very first years of U.S. engagement with Pakistan. In a policy statement issued on July 1, 1951, the U.S. State Department declared: "Apart from Communism, the other main threat to American interests in Pakistan was from ‘reactionary groups of landholders and uneducated religious leaders' who were opposed to the ‘present Western-minded government' and ‘favor a return to primitive Islamic principles.'" However, over the last four decades-until September 11-the U.S. government did little to discourage Islamabad's embrace of obscurantist Islam as its state ideology, empowering Pakistan's religious leaders beyond their support among the populace and tying the Islamists to Pakistan's military-civil bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus.America's alliance with Pakistan, or rather with the Pakistani military, has had three significant consequences for Pakistan. First, because the U.S. military sees Pakistan in the context of its Middle East strategy, Pakistan has become more oriented toward the Middle East even though it is geographically and historically a part of South Asia. Second, the intermittent flow of U.S. military and economic assistance has encouraged Pakistan's military leaders to over-estimate their power potential. This, in turn, has contributed to their reluctance to accept normal relations with India even after learning through repeated misadventures that Pakistan can, at best, hold India to a draw in military conflict and cannot defeat it. Third, the ability to secure military and economic aid by fitting into the current paradigm of American policy has made Pakistan a rentier state, albeit one that lives off the rents for its strategic location.The U.S. might be able to change Pakistan's pretense of being a Middle Eastern State by taking it out of the area of operations of the American military's Central Command (cent Com) and placing it under Pacific Command (PaCom), along with India. This would ensure greater interaction between senior Indian and Pakistani military officers and enable the U.S. military to look at India and Pakistan in a realistic manner. As things have been since the 1950s, American military planners dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia feel obliged to include Pakistan in their plans as the Eastern anchor of their strategy. Pakistani generals offer them operational support significant in their regional context but not necessarily as important for the big picture of American policy. Pakistan's military has successfully used its contacts with Central Command officers to promote a more positive view of itself than might have emerged if the same American officers were also dealing with the rest of South Asia at the same time.The other two distortions affecting Pakistan -an exaggerated view of Pakistani power and the complexities of being a rentier state - are the direct outcome of American policy relating to foreign aid. U.S. assistance appears to have influenced the internal dynamic of Pakistan negatively, bolstering its military's praetorian ambitions. According to figures provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1954 and 2002, the U.S. provided a total of $ 12.6 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan. Of these $ 9.19 billion were given during 28 years of military rule while only $ 3.4 billion were provided to civilian regimes covering 22 years. On average, US aid to Pakistan amounted to $ 339.3 million for each year of military rule compared with only $ 156 million per annum under civilian leadership.Contrary to American assumption that aid translates into leverage, Pakistan's military has always managed to take the aid without ever fully giving the United States what it desires. During the 1950s and 1960s, Ayub Khan over-sold Pakistan's willingness to help the United States in containing Communist expansion. Pakistan provided significant intelligence gathering facilities for a while but never provided the "centrally positioned landing site" the U.S. sought. Zia ul-Haq's cooperation in bleeding the Soviets in Afghanistan came with Pakistan's plan to install a client regime in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S. never controlled Pakistan's ISI, or far that matter the Mujahideen, even though it paid for the operation. Pakistan's role in the Jihad against the Soviet Union also inspired Pakistani Jihadis to expand Jihad into Kashmir. Musharraf's help in the hunt for Al-Qaeda also remains selective. Pakistan's unwillingness to fulfill American expectations, rather than American fickleness, has led to the on-off aid relationship between the two countries. The Pakistani military has been unhappy each time the aid pipeline was shut down and turned its people against the U.S. While aid flows, however, it is the Pakistani military and not the U.S. that

gains leverage. U.S. policy-makers need to recognize the limits of aid as leverage with Pakistan. Instead of heaping praise on Pakistan's soldier-politicians, the U.S. could try deflating their egos. A more modest aid package delivered steadily, aimed at key sectors of the Pakistani economy, would not raise Pakistani expectations and could, over time, create a reliable pocket of influence for the U.S. among the country's elite. The pattern of large doses of aid, given as strategic rent or quid pro quo for Pakistan's cooperation in a specific sphere, has historically provided the U.S. with limited leverage. With the dissipation of aid, the U.S. loses that limited leverage and Pakistan's elite gets embittered.Washington has never been able to develop a policy that exclusively focuses on dealing with Islamabad and its dysfunction. Instead, Pakistan has generally been placed into broader U.S. policy objectives: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, restrictions on Soviet expansion in Afghanistan during the 1980s, nuclear nonproliferation during the 1990s, and the war against terrorism since September 11. Washington's quid pro quo approach in dealing with Pakistan has often helped confront the issue at hand while creating another security problem down the road. General Ayub Khan had found U.S. eagerness to contain communism during the 1950s useful to extract the right price for Pakistan's participation in anti-Communist treaties. U.S. Cold War support subsequently enabled the Pakistani military to use force in the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, leading to Pakistan's bifurcation.History repeated itself when the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 made Pakistan a front-line state in resisting Communist expansion. Just as General Ayub Khan had before, General Zia bargained for more aid in return for allowing Pakistan to be the staging ground for an anti-Soviet insurgency during the 1980s. But Zia also used the cover of the Afghan jihad to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities for Pakistan, circumventing U.S. legislation aimed at nonproliferation. With help from the United States, Zia also modernized Pakistan's military and prepared for a broader jihad to expand Pakistan's influence in the region, building a cadre of Islamist guerillas and giving rise to Pakistan's ambitions to create a client regime in Afghanistan, which in turn resulted in the Taliban's ascendancy and ability to provide sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Washington's preoccupation with the success of the anti-Soviet struggle enabled Pakistan to defeat two U.S. objectives (nuclear nonproliferation and security in the Middle East and South Asia) while attaining one (the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan) and empowered an entirely new threat of radical Islamic terrorism.In some ways, Islamabad's relationship with Washington has become a contributing factor to the Pakistani crisis by allowing Pakistan's leaders to believe that they can continue to promote risky domestic, regional, and pan-Islamic policies. The availability of U.S. assistance-offered to secure Pakistani cooperation in U.S. grand strategy-has exacerbated Pakistan's dysfunction and its structural flaws.Currently, U.S. hopes in Pakistan are pinned to Musharraf's commitment to U.S. interests. Assassination attempts on Musharraf, from which he has narrowly escaped, have raised the question of whether U.S. policy interests would be adequately served beyond the period of Musharraf's indefinite tenure. Although it may be difficult for U.S. and Pakistani policymakers to force an end to Pakistan's status as an Islamic ideological state, changes in the nature of the Pakistani state can gradually wean the country away from Islamic extremism. Musharraf can't. Over the years, military rule has fomented religious militancy in Pakistan. Under military leadership, Pakistan has defined its national objective as wresting Kashmir from India and, in recent years, establishing a client regime in Afghanistan. Unless Islamabad's objectives are redefined to focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in governance-which the military remains institutionally reluctant to do-the state will continue to turn to Islam as a national unifier.If Pakistan proceeded along the path of normal political and economic development, it would not need the exaggerated political and strategic role for Islam that has characterized much of its history. The United States, for its own interests, cannot afford the current rise in Islamic militancy in a large Muslim country which has nuclear weapons capabilities, a large standing army, and a huge intelligence service, capable of conducting covert operations to destabilize neighboring governments in the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and Central Asia.The influence of Islamists in Pakistan can perhaps be best contained through democracy. A majority of Pakistanis in elections has repeatedly demonstrated that the populace does not share the Islamist vision for the country. Despite the MMA's unprecedented electoral performance in 2002, the alliance garnered only 11 percent of the total votes cast. The Islamist vote as a percentage of total registered voters has been more or less stagnant since the 1970s. The strength of the Islamists, however, lies in their ability to mobilize financial and human resources. Islamists run schools, operate charities, and publish newspapers; moreover, they are able to put their organized cadres on the streets. Thus, in the absence of democratic decision-making, the Islamists can dominate the political discourse. Pakistan's secular civil society is either apolitical or insufficiently organized, and secular political parties have consistently been dismembered by successive military governments.Strengthening civil society and building secular political parties as a countervailing force in Pakistan can contain the demands for Islamization made by the religious parties and radical Islamist groups. In recent years the U.S. has accepted, even endorsed the criticism on account of corruption and bad governance heaped on Pakistan's popular politicians by the Pakistani military and civilian oligarchy. But in the absence of a sustained political process, Pakistan is unlikely to produce honest politicians capable of running the country. Meanwhile the military, which lacks political legitimacy, would continue to influence the course of events with the help of its Islamist allies, who extract the price for their support for greater adherence to the notion of the Islamic ideological state. Instead of accepting the military's right to set politics right, U.S. policy should insist on a sustained constitutional and political process in Pakistan. Political corruption and fiscal mismanagement need not be ignored but it should not be allowed to be used as justification for the military's continued intervention, which makes it difficult for Pakistan to break away from its ideological tripod. Moderate and inclusive politics have worked well to contain the Islamists in the past. Whenever an elected political leader has rejected Islamists' demands, fears of a backlash have failed to materialize. Between 1972 and 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was able to successfully expand the role of women in the public arena despite Islamist opposition, and in 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif faced only a limited reaction when he reversed the decision to observe Friday as a weekly religious holiday. Conversely, the Islamists have won their major policy victories thanks to regimes seeking their support to garner political legitimacy or to achieve strategic objectives. Unlike the situation in some other Muslim countries such as Egypt and Turkey, the state (and particularly the military) in

Pakistan has encouraged political and radical Islam, which otherwise has a relatively narrow base of support. Democratic consensus on limiting or reversing Islamization would gradually roll back the Islamist influence in Pakistani public life. The Islamists would maintain their role as a minority pressure group representing a particular point of view, but they would stop wielding their current disproportionate influence over the country's overall direction.The United States can help contain the Islamists' influence by demanding reform of those aspects of Pakistan's governance that involve the military and security services. Until now, the U.S. has been very harsh in criticizing ‘corrupt' or ‘ineffective' Pakistani politicians but mild in its treatment of the military's meddling. Between 1988 and1999, when civilians ostensibly governed Pakistan, American officials routinely criticized the civilians' conduct but refrained from commenting on the negative role of the military and the intelligence services despite overwhelming evidence of that role. The ISI's manipulation of the 1988, 1990 and 1997 elections went publicly unnoticed by the U.S. while the Pakistani military's version of events regarding the politicians' failings was generally accepted without acknowledging the impact of limits set for the politicians by the military. Washington should no longer condone the Pakistani military's support for Islamic militants, its use of the intelligence apparatus for controlling domestic politics, and its refusal to cede power to a constitutional democratic government. In its role as an aid donor, Washington has become one of Pakistan's most important benefactors. But a large part of U.S. economic assistance since September 11 has been used to pay down Pakistan's foreign debt. Because Washington has attached few conditions to U.S. aid, the spending patterns of Pakistan's government have not changed significantly. The country's military spending continues to increase, and spending for social services is well below the level required to improve living conditions for ordinary Pakistanis. Consequently, the United States should use its aid as a lever to influence Pakistan's domestic policies. Even though Musharraf's cooperation in hunting down Al Qaeda terrorists is a positive development, Washington must not ignore Pakistan's state sponsorship of Islamist militants, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles at the expense of education and health care, and its refusal to democratize; each of these issues is directly linked to the future of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan.The U.S. clearly has few good short-term policy options in relation to Pakistan. American policy-makers should endeavor to recognize the failings of their past policies and avoid repeating their mistakes. The U.S. has sought short-term gains from its relationship with Pakistan, inadvertently accentuating that country's problems in the process. Pakistan's civil and military elite, on the other hand, must understand how their three-part paradigm for state and nation building has led Pakistan from one disaster to the next. Pakistan was created in a hurry and without giving detailed thought to various aspects of nation and state building. Perhaps it is time to rectify that mistake by taking a long-term view. Both, Pakistan's elite and their American benefactors would have to participate in transforming Pakistan into a functional, rather than ideological, State. USAID Aid to Pakistan during the different Civilian and Military Regimes

(in Millions of USD)	Political Situation	Years	Economic	Military	Total	Civilia
Misc.		1954-58	627.3	363.7	991	Military Period
Gen. Ayub Khan		1959-69	2974.9	349.2	3324.1	Military Period
Gen. Yahya Khan		1970-71	317.7	0.4	318.1	Civilian Period
Z.A. Bhutto		1972-77	937.3	1.7	939	Military Period
Ziaul Haq		1978-88	2562.8	1775.7	4338.5	Civilian Period
Misc.		1989-99	1087.4	415.8	1503.2	Military Period
Pervez Musharraf		2000-2003	1047.7	532.2	1519.9	TOTAL 1954-2003

Civilian Period	1954-58	1972-77	1989-99	22 yrs.	TOTAL:	991		
71	1978-88	2000-03	28 yrs.	TOTAL:	3642.2	4338.5	1519.9	